Forfeiture Laws Being Used All Over U.S.
Against sexworkers Even if never charged!
Phoenix BUST UPDATE:
For Background see: In Phoenix - Operation House Call - Maybe Biggest
Private Adult Prostitution Bust in U.S. History at
http://www.sexwork.com/Phoenix/bustof2003.html
Criminal Charges dropped is only part of the legal problem
Civil Forfeiture Law
While criminal charges have been dropped for now, there may be a major issue
about getting seized property back. Amazingly the civil forfeiture laws
especially in Arizona means property can be kept even if person is NEVER
criminally charged or charges dismissed. I assume this is why attorney Bob
Jung on the List has indicated he is now fighting to get clients property
back.
In Arizona, the attorney general's office has unabashedly proclaimed that
the mission of Arizona's forfeiture laws is "'social engineering' accomplished
through government intercession in commercial activity harmful to the economy
as a whole." When such a broad official charter for forfeiture is combined
with the unique litigation advantages that forfeiture law already offers
to law enforcement, a powerful engine of government power is unleashed.".
Source CATO institute good article at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-179es.html
There is a group (aside from the ACLU and Institute for Justice) dedicated
soley to reforming/repealing asset forfeiture statutes as well as educating
the public about them. They are called FEAR (Forfeiture Endangers American
Rights). Their website is: http://www.fear.org
Good Article From New Jersey is Typical how laws used
whether its about marijuana busts or private sexworkers
Policing and Prosecuting For Profit:
New Jersey Ex-Sheriff
Fights Civil Forfeiture Abuse
Source: Institute For Justice at
http://www.ij.org/media/private_property/new_jersey/background.shtml
Article shared with full credit and no commercial purpose under the fair
use
educational provisions of the U.S. Copyright Law and International treaties.
Introduction
The overriding goal for law enforcement officials—both prosecutors and
police—should be fair and impartial administration of justice. But
New Jersey’s civil forfeiture law dangerously transforms law enforcement
priorities away from this goal and instead toward the pursuit of property
and profit. How? New Jersey prosecutors and police are entitled
to keep the money and property confiscated from individuals through the
state’s civil forfeiture law, thus giving them a direct financial stake
in the outcome of forfeiture efforts. Such a statutory scheme perverts
law enforcement’s responsibility to enforce the law fairly and spells disaster
for innocent property owners caught up in forfeiture proceedings.
Civil forfeiture laws represent one of the most
serious assaults on private property rights in the nation today. This
legal doctrine allows the government acting under sanction of law enforcement
to seize property and keep the proceeds on the flimsiest of pretenses.
Under civil forfeiture, it is not necessary for the government to demonstrate
that the property’s owner is guilty of criminal misconduct. Indeed,
forfeiture can take place even when criminal charges have never been filed
against a property owner. Making matters worse, forfeiture procedures
give the government all the advantages, while all the burdens are placed
on property owners to attempt to reclaim ownership of their property.
All levels of government for almost two decades have horribly abused
the civil forfeiture power. The Institute for Justice is now involved
in a case in southern New Jersey that represents an all-too-typical abuse
of forfeiture laws. The case, State of New Jersey v. One 1990 Ford
Thunderbird, [1] presents an opportunity
not only to regain the property of an innocent owner faced with forfeiture,
but also to challenge what often drives forfeiture abuse: the direct financial
incentive in forfeiture laws for police and prosecutors to maximize the
number of seizures.
Taking From Innocent Owners to Give to Law Enforcement Agencies
The Institute represents Carol Thomas of Millville, New Jersey, the owner
of a 1990 Ford Thunderbird. The case arose when Ms. Thomas’s
then 17-year-old son used her car to sell marijuana to an undercover officer.
He was arrested, eventually pleaded guilty to the charge, and faced his
punishment. But that did not end the matter. In addition to
pursuing the criminal case, the government also pursued Thomas’s car in
a civil forfeiture proceeding even though no drugs were found in the car;
she bought the car with a bank loan she secured; and she unquestionably
was not aware of and did not consent to her son using her car to sell marijuana.
No matter. Under New Jersey forfeiture law, the government can still
pursue the forfeiture action because of the legal fiction that the car is
guilty of a crime.
Given the facts of this case, Thomas’s profession at the time of her
son’s arrest is somewhat surprising: she was a seven-year veteran officer
with the Cumberland County Sheriff’s Office. During that time, she
had actually served on certain occasions with the county’s narcotics task
force, the same unit that arrested her son and seized her car. Thomas
has subsequently left the sheriff’s department and has decided to fight
abusive forfeiture laws
Similar to the law at the federal level and in several states, forfeited
property and proceeds in New Jersey are given to prosecutors’ offices and
police departments. Seizing and prosecuting agencies are thus granted
a direct and significant stake in the outcome of forfeiture efforts, encouraging
the government to seize as much property as possible. Not only does
this scheme pervert law enforcement’s responsibility to enforce the law
fairly (and transform it into a form of legalized bounty hunting), it often
sweeps up wholly innocent individuals, like Ms. Thomas, in forfeiture proceedings.
Such schemes also raise serious constitutional concerns. Fundamental
to the Constitution’s due process guarantee is that the government act in
an impartial manner in the administration of justice. The due process
clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits statutory schemes, like New Jersey’s
civil forfeiture law, that create actual bias, the potential for bias, or
even the appearance of bias in the administration of justice. In representing
Thomas, the Institute seeks to stop New Jersey from taking her car while
also ending the direct, perverse profit incentive at the heart of forfeiture
laws.
A Brief History of Civil Forfeiture
Under laws at both the federal and state levels, governments can forfeit
property either under criminal or civil law. Criminal forfeiture is
tied to the criminal conviction of an individual. But civil forfeiture
is a legal fiction that treats inanimate objects used by someone in furtherance
of criminal activity as if the objects themselves acted to assist in the
commission of a crime. That is why civil forfeiture proceedings have
bizarre titles, such as United States v. $10,500 in U.S. Currency or Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania v. A Parcel of Land and Buildings or, as in Ms. Thomas’s
case, State of New Jersey v. One 1990 Ford Thunderbird. Civil forfeiture
actions are in rem proceedings, which means literally “against a thing.”
Of course, objects such as cash, property, cars, or boats sued for participation
in criminal activity do not act or think. The doctrine of in rem forfeiture
arose from Medieval ideas, rooted in the ancient law of “deodand.”
[2] Kings, for instance, could seize an instrument that caused
the death of another in order to finance the deceased’s funeral mass.
[3] The idea arose from a superstitious belief that objects acted
independently to cause death. [4]
While the concept of deodand gives rise to the “guilty property” legal fiction,
American forfeiture law did not arise strictly from this concept, but rather
from the British Navigation Acts of the mid-17th century.
[5] The Acts were passed during England’s vast expansion as a
maritime power. The Acts required imports and exports from England
to be carried on British ships. If the Acts were violated, the ships
or the cargo on board could be seized and forfeited to the crown regardless
of the guilt or innocence of the owner.
Using the British statutes as a model, the first United States
Congress passed forfeiture statutes to aid in the collection of customs
duties, which provided 80-90% of the finances for the federal government
during that time. [6] Civil
or in rem forfeitures were introduced in American law through these early
customs statutes. The forfeiture power was upheld in early Supreme
Court cases. [7] The most important
aspect of these early forfeiture cases, however, is the justification provided
for the application of civil forfeiture even to innocent property owners.
The Supreme Court held that civil forfeiture was closely tied to the practical
necessities of enforcing admiralty, piracy, and customs laws. In rem
forfeiture permitted courts to obtain jurisdiction over property when it
was virtually impossible to obtain personal jurisdiction over the property
owners guilty of violating maritime law. Therefore, the government
could ensure that customs and other laws were enforced even if the owner
of the ship or the cargo was outside the court’s jurisdiction. Justice
Story wrote that the “vessel which commits the aggression is treated as
the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture
attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of
the owner.” [8] However, Story
justified such forfeitures “from the necessity of the case, as the only
adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or insuring an indemnity
to the injured party.” [9]
Civil forfeitures were released from their historical moorings
during the Civil War. The Confiscation Acts allowed the Union to seize
and forfeit the rebels’ Northern property and the property of those who
aided the Confederacy. [10]
In 1862, the Supreme Court of Kentucky declared the Acts unconstitutional
and presciently observed that “[t]hese in rem proceedings may today be the
engines of punishment to the rebels, but, in the future, they may be the
instruments of oppression, injustice, and tyranny. . . .”
[11] Numerous challenges to these Acts were mounted and eventually
the Supreme Court agreed to address the constitutional issues. In
1871, the Acts were upheld against Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenges.
[12] Upholding the Confiscation Acts in the face of constitutional
attack worked “a revolution in forfeiture law that persists to this day--use
of the in rem action without constitutional limitation. It is unlikely
that such a change would have occurred had it not been for the passions
raised by the Civil War.” [13]
Although the Supreme Court had permitted the government to expand the
forfeiture power, throughout most of the 20th Century, civil forfeiture
remained a relative backwater in American law, with one exception: it was
used extensively during Prohibition against automobiles and other vehicles
transporting illegal liquor. Modern civil forfeiture use exploded
during the early 1980s as government at all levels stepped up the War on
Drugs. No longer is civil forfeiture tied to the practical necessities
of enforcing maritime law and to the difficulties of obtaining personal
jurisdiction over an individual. Released from its historical limitation
as a necessary means of enforcing admiralty and customs laws, the forfeiture
power has instead become one of the most powerful weapons in the government’s
crime-fighting arsenal. And, as described below, the forfeiture power
is not limited to fighting the Drug War. It has grown to include a
plethora of crimes at the federal and state levels.
Modern Civil Forfeiture Laws
At the federal level alone, over 200 forfeiture statutes exist, allowing
confiscation of private property for federal crimes ranging from drug offenses,
mail fraud, and immigration violations to illegally collecting the feathers
of a migratory bird and failing to report to the IRS money order purchases
of over $3,000. [14]
Not surprisingly, the vast powers granted to governments under forfeiture
laws have led to widespread abuse, documented in numerous studies and investigations
throughout the 1990s. [15]
Wholly innocent individuals or individuals with attenuated connection to
illegal activity saw their property taken by the government with very little
recourse. In the early 1990s, the Pittsburgh Press (now the Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette) exposed how the police subvert the rule of law, target minorities,
and kill small businesses to fund the war on drugs through the use of civil
forfeiture. [16] The Orlando
Sentinel showed how lax civil forfeiture laws helped create the Volusia
County Sheriff’s Department extortion racket along Interstate 95.
[17] And CBS’s 60 Minutes stunned the nation with the story of
Donald Scott, who was killed in a botched drug raid by local, state and
federal police who hoped to seize his $5 million dollar ranch.
[18]
And the abuses of forfeiture laws continue. In March 1999, Jim
and Amba Patel had their hotel forfeited and sold because drugs had been
sold on the premises. Despite the motel owners’ attempts to keep drug
dealers off the premises by installing floodlights and fences and calling
the police, their property was nevertheless taken.
[19] No charges were filed against the Wichita, Kansas couple,
because, as U.S. Attorney Jackie Williams noted: “the most effective way
to deal with the Patels themselves was to go the civil route, where the
burden of proof is somewhat less than in a criminal case.”
[20] As Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas noted, the numerous
horror stories of property owners caught in the web of government’s enormous
forfeiture power has spawned “distrust of the Government’s aggressive use
of civil forfeiture statutes.”
[21]
Law enforcement chooses civil forfeiture because the deck is stacked
against property owners. In civil proceedings, for instance, the government
only needs to prove the property’s connection to allegedly criminal activity
by a mere “preponderance of evidence” standard, not proof “beyond a reasonable
doubt” as in criminal cases. [22]
Because it is the property itself that is the target of the lawsuit, the
owner of the property need not be convicted of or even charged with any
criminal activity for the government to forfeit the property.
Indeed, one study found that approximately 80% of persons whose property
was seized by the federal government for forfeiture were never even charged
with a crime. [23] Moreover,
property can be forfeited even if someone used the property without the
owners’ knowledge or consent. [24]
Drawing on the long tradition of civil forfeiture in American law (but
ignoring its original intent as a necessary means of enforcing maritime
law), the Supreme Court recently upheld the forfeiture of wholly innocent
owners’ property in its notorious decision in Bennis v. State of Michigan.
[25] There, the government successfully forfeited a woman’s car
when her husband, unbeknownst to her, used it to engage the services of
a prostitute. Federal forfeiture laws and some state statutes, including
New Jersey’s, have provisions that allow innocent owners to try to get their
property back, but the hurdles are high and many property owners simply
cannot afford the costs of fighting forfeitures of their property.
New Jersey has one of the broadest civil forfeiture statutes in the country.
In most states, forfeiture provisions are tied to specific criminal statutes
such as drug or prostitution laws. But New Jersey’s forfeiture provisions
apply to all “unlawful activity” and “illegal acts” under the New Jersey
criminal code. [26] Any criminal
activity in New Jersey, except unindictable and minor crimes like disorderly
person offenses, can lead to a civil forfeiture proceeding
In New Jersey forfeiture proceedings, a person who has property seized
for forfeiture can try to secure release of the property pending the outcome
of the forfeiture, but must post a bond with the court in the amount of
the market value of the seized item.
[27] In order to enforce the forfeiture, the government must
file a civil lawsuit against the property sought to be forfeited within
90 days of the initial seizure of the property. Any person making
a claim to the seized property must answer the complaint within 35 days.
If no answer is filed to the complaint, then the property is automatically
forfeited to the government. [28]
Moreover, New Jersey allows a particularly tenuous connection between
the forfeited property and any possible criminal activity. In New
Jersey, proof of criminal activity by the property owner or anyone else
is not required under the law. For instance, New Jersey courts have
held that even an unexplained large amount of cash by itself can be persuasive
evidence of illegal drug activity and thus lead to forfeiture of the cash.
[29] Moreover, New Jersey courts have upheld forfeitures of cash
even when neither drugs nor drug paraphernalia were found.
[30] Courts have held that the absence of any requirement that
a person be charged or convicted of a crime before forfeiture is permissible
because the proceedings are civil, directed at the property itself and not
against a person who has committed wrongdoing.
[31]
In reality, few property owners can meet the burdens of civil forfeiture
proceedings and often do not challenge seizures of their property.
This is especially true when government seizes property the value of which
would be greatly exceeded by the time, attorney fees, and other expenses
necessary to fight the forfeiture. For instance, Carol Thomas’ Thunderbird
is only valued at $1500. As a result, many property owners do not
and cannot challenge forfeitures, and the government obtains the property
by default.
The unfairness of forfeiture proceedings and the abuse of civil forfeiture
laws at the federal and state levels prompted the U.S. Congress to change
the procedures to give greater protections to property owners. On
April 25, 2000, President Clinton signed civil forfeiture reform legislation
passed by wide margins in the Senate and House, which, among other protections,
raised the burden of proof in federal forfeiture proceedings and allowed
property owners more time to challenge forfeiture before losing their property
by default. But these changes at the federal level have no impact
on state civil forfeiture laws. Moreover, even at the federal level,
one aspect of civil forfeiture was not changed, and indeed it is this aspect
of civil forfeiture that is in most desperate need of reform: the direct
profit incentive granted to prosecutors and police to forfeit as much property
as possible.
Perverse Incentives under Federal and New Jersey Civil Forfeiture Law
In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, vastly
expanding both the powers of government to seize and forfeit private property
while also adding forfeiture provisions to numerous federal criminal statutes.
Perhaps most significantly, Congress also established the Assets Forfeiture
Fund, administered by the U.S. Department of Justice, and charged with collecting
and distributing proceeds from forfeitures.
[32] Previously, all proceeds from forfeitures exceeding $5 million
were transferred to the general fund of the Treasury.
[33] The 1984 changes eliminated the ceiling and allowed unlimited
proceeds to be placed in the fund for exclusive use by law enforcement agencies.
[34] The 1984 amendments also revolutionized civil forfeiture
by allowing federal forfeiture proceeds to be shared with state and local
law enforcement agencies. [35]
After law enforcement agencies were granted a direct financial
incentive to initiate and prosecute forfeiture actions, the use of the new
statute and revenues generated by civil forfeiture skyrocketed. Proceeds
from civil forfeiture jumped from $27 million in 1985 to $644 million in
1991, an increase of over 1500%. [36]
Two forfeiture funds currently exist at the federal level: the
Department of Justice fund covering forfeiture proceeds generated by DOJ
agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration and the FBI; and the
Treasury Forfeiture Fund, covering forfeitures by Treasury Department agencies
such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
[37] In fiscal year 1998 alone, over $448 million in forfeiture
deposits were placed in the DOJ fund, while $248 million was deposited in
the Treasury Fund. [38] Since
1986, more than $5.5 billion have been deposited in the DOJ fund and over
$1.8 billion in the Treasury fund. [39]
Under federal law, the property and proceeds from these forfeiture
funds are retained and used for “law enforcement” purposes by the “seizing
agencies.” [40] This form
of “revenue enhancement” is outside the normal appropriation and budget
processes. [41]
The system outlined above creates a perverse incentive structure
for law enforcement officials. The intent of such laws was to deprive
criminals of their ill-gotten property and cash and then use those proceeds
to enforce the very laws the wrongdoers violated. The unintended consequence
of this effort, however, was that many officials now view raising revenue—not
enforcing the law fairly and justly—as the primary goal of their activities.
A recent study found that “numerous law enforcement agencies now rely on
forfeitures to fund a significant part of their operations.”
[42] Under federal forfeiture laws, the more an agency seizes
and successfully forfeits, the richer it becomes. As Gary Schons,
a former California Deputy Attorney General observed: “Much like a drug
addict becomes addicted to drugs, law enforcement agencies have become dependent
on asset forfeitures. They have to have it.”
[43] Memoranda issued by various officials at the federal level
through the 1990s highlight the goal of revenue by encouraging “increased
forfeiture production,” actions that can be taken to “maximize deposits
to the [Asset Forfeiture] Fund,” and threats to cut agency funding if “projected
levels of forfeiture deposits” were not met.”
[44] One former director of the Justice Department’s Asset Forfeiture
Office candidly admits: “We had a situation in which the desire to deposit
money into the asset forfeiture fund became the reason for being for forfeiture,
eclipsing in certain measure the desire to effect fair enforcement of the
laws.” [45]
In many states, the perverse forfeiture incentive structure is
the same as, if not even worse, than at the federal level. Some states,
such Iowa and Vermont, correctly require forfeiture proceeds to be deposited
into the state’s general fund, and then elected officials decide how the
money is going to be spent. But in most states, including New Jersey,
forfeiture proceeds are funneled directly back to the very agencies and
offices that are charged with enforcing the law. Not surprisingly,
some of the very same types of abuses that occur on the federal level also
take place with alarming frequency on the state and local level. The
seizure of Donald Scott’s ranch, mentioned previously, where Scott was shot
dead in front of his wife and no drugs were ever found on his property was,
the Ventura County District Attorney’s office found, “motivated, at least
in part, by a desire to seize and forfeit the ranch for the government.”
[46] Moreover, in the late 1990s, it was exposed that local law
enforcement in Louisiana fabricated drug crimes to seize innocent people’s
property, and then the police used the proceeds for ski trips to Aspen,
Colorado. [47] In 1999, the
Kansas City Star uncovered how local law enforcement officials turned forfeitures
over to the federal government for prosecution in order to avoid the state
law requirement that forfeiture proceeds go to the public schools.
The federal government and state officials then divided up the forfeiture
bounty amongst themselves. [48]
In New Jersey, law enforcement also keeps the forfeited property,
with similar consequences. Under New Jersey law, the forfeited property
and proceeds are used exclusively for law enforcement purposes.
[49] Seizing and prosecuting agencies in New Jersey are thus
granted a direct financial stake in the outcome of forfeiture efforts.
New Jersey only maintains publicly available figures (compiled for six-month
periods) for forfeiture on the state level and only for drug offenses.
[50] But even with this limited information available,
the state’s figures indicate the wide scope of civil forfeiture. For
example, between January and June 1996, state law enforcement officials
(excluding county law enforcement agencies) seized and forfeited $2.49 million
dollars in cash and 34 vehicles worth over $300,000.
[51]
It is up to the county prosecutor or State Attorney General, whoever
is prosecuting the case, to determine which law enforcement agencies get
what percentage of the property or proceeds from forfeiture, based upon
the agency’s involvement in the prosecution of the forfeiture case.
The Attorney General has wide discretion to determine what constitutes a
“law enforcement purpose.” [52]
For instance, between January 1998 and June 1998, the state collected $1.77
million in forfeiture proceeds. Among the proceeds distributed were:
$373,000 for “Asset Maintenance,” $128,000 for “medical service of enlisted
personnel,” $60,000 for “Confidential Purposes” and $244,967 to the Division
of Taxation, Office of Criminal Investigation for the purchase of ten vehicles
and other equipment. [53]
Likewise, at the county level, prosecutors distribute forfeited assets
and proceeds for a wide variety of supposed law enforcement purposes, from
new vehicles to conference and travel expenses, at the discretion of the
county prosecutor. The Asbury Park Press recently reported on a county
auction in which “Camaros, Firebirds, Porsches, and BMWs from the county
prosecutor’s drug forfeiture unit” will be on sale.
[54] And a spokesman for the Mahwah, New Jersey police department
stated this year in regard to money seized from a Canadian couple that had
not been indicted, “We’re very excited about getting the money because we’ll
be able to do things we wouldn’t normally be able to do.”
[55] With the proceeds, the Mahwah police stated that they would
purchase a pickup truck and laptop computers for their officers.
[56] Not surprisingly, officials tend to stretch the definition
of what constitutes “law enforcement purposes.” Until the state legislature
started investigating, New Jersey county prosecutors and the state attorney
general routinely spent forfeiture funds for prosecutor conventions.
For instance, over a three-year period, over $500,000 in forfeited funds
went for entertainment and other expenses at prosecutor conventions, including
$2,800 spent to hire Mr. Peanut to greet prosecutors and their families
at the Trump Regency Ballroom. [57]
Captain Steve Terry of the Atlantic County’s Prosecutor’s Office
explained the expenditure: “You can’t expect these people to come to Atlantic
City and not be greeted by Mr. Peanut.”
[58]
Litigation Strategy
Whether operating in the public or private spheres of life, individuals
tend to promote their self-interest in any given instance.
[59] A key distinction, however, is that in the private, voluntary
sphere, self-interested transactions usually generate mutually beneficial
outcomes because they are consensual. Conversely, the coercive nature
of government action requires constraints to be placed on self-interest
through clearly defined and strictly enforced constitutional rules.
The Framers of the Constitution recognized this natural proclivity of self-interest
and the need for institutional restraints on government action:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were
to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would
be necessary. . . . A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary
control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity
of auxiliary precautions. [60]
Through the due process clause of the Constitution, the Founders
guaranteed impartiality in civil and criminal proceedings and established
fair and impartial decision-making as a bedrock principle of our justice
system.
While many individuals within a government organization may share
a principled commitment to carrying out the mission of the agency, government
officials, operating in what they perceive as their own self-interest, will
also attempt to maximize the size and budget of their agency. Larger
budgets will benefit everyone within an agency through higher salaries,
greater job security, better equipment, and increased power and prestige.
The incentive to maximize a department’s budget through improper action
is particularly strong in the context of civil forfeiture. Such incentives
can affect even the most well-intentioned law enforcement officers.
When public officials and their agencies have a direct financial stake
in the outcome of their actions, as in the case of civil forfeiture, the
Supreme Court subjects such actions to particularly close scrutiny under
the due process guarantees of the Constitution.
[61] In Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,
[62] for instance, while upholding civil penalty provisions under the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the Supreme Court declared that “[a] scheme injecting
a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process
may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision
and in some contexts raise serious constitutional questions.”
[63] Such serious questions are raised, in part, when a government
official’s “judgment will be distorted by the prospect of institutional
gains as a result of zealous enforcement efforts.”
[64]
The due process clause can be violated even if the official does not
receive a direct personal benefit from a particular scheme, so long as an
agency or department directly benefits. Also, the relevant inquiry
is whether a scheme creates a possible temptation to distort the justice
system for monetary gain, rather than proven biased results in particular
instances. To determine whether a prosecutorial scheme such as New
Jersey’s civil forfeiture law violates the due process clause, the Supreme
Court has set forth three relevant factors: the financial dependence of
law enforcement agencies on the collected revenues, the personal interest
of the officials or agencies in the scheme, and the funding formula mandated
and used by the government. [65]
New Jersey’s civil forfeiture law violates all three of these factors.
First, under New Jersey’s civil forfeiture statute, law enforcement agencies
at the state and local levels can and do fund their activities through forfeiture.
Second, law enforcement agencies receive direct tangible benefits from forfeiture,
such as increased law enforcement budgets, medical services, overtime pay,
conference attendance, use of seized vehicles, purchase of new vehicles,
etc. Third, the departments are reimbursed based not on the expenses
incurred in undertaking the forfeiture, but rather on the basis of how much
property was seized and forfeited. The more seizures and forfeitures
the departments undertake, the higher the reward. New Jersey’s
method of distributing forfeited property and proceeds creates at a minimum
the potential for or the appearance of bias if not actual bias in the forfeiture
of individuals’ property and violates the right of property owners to impartial
justice guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
This case, State of New Jersey v. One 1990 Ford Thunderbird (and Carol
Thomas) is in Cumberland County Superior Court. Although the State
of New Jersey has filed the action against the car, Ms. Thomas has filed
a counterclaim in the suit, challenging the law’s requirement that forfeited
property and proceeds be funneled back to the very agencies and offices
charged with enforcing the law. The counterclaim states that this
requirement violates the due process clauses of the U.S. and New Jersey
Constitutions. By removing the perverse incentive structure behind
New Jersey’s civil forfeiture law, this lawsuit seeks to reorient law enforcement
priorities away from profit-making and back to fair and impartial administration
of justice. Our hope is to establish a constitutional precedent that
will restrain government abuses at the federal, state, and local levels.
Litigation Team
The lead lawyer for the Institute for Justice in this case is Senior
Attorney Scott Bullock. Joining in the litigation team is Institute
President and General Counsel William H. Mellor and Managing Director Deborah
Simpson. We are joined by able local counsel Joseph M. Chiarello of
Jacob, Ferrigno and Chiarello in Millville, New Jersey.
For more information contact:
John Kramer
Vice President for Communications
Institute for Justice
1717 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Suite 200
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 955-1300
The Institute for Justice is a Washington, D.C.-based public interest
law firm. It advances a rule of law under which individuals control
their destinies as free and responsible members of society. Through
strategic litigation, training, and outreach, the Institute secures greater
protection for individual liberty, challenges the scope and ideology of
the Regulatory Welfare State, and illustrates and extends the benefits of
freedom to those whose full enjoyment of liberty is denied by government.
The Institute was founded in September 1991 by William Mellor and Clint
Bolick.
[1] Docket No. CUM-L-000720-99
(N.J. Superior Court, Law Division, Cumberland County, 1999).
[2] Boudreaux & Pritchard, Civil
Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons from Economics and History, 33
San Diego L. Rev. 79, 94 (1996).
[5] Id.; Schecter, Fear and Loathing
and the Forfeiture Laws, 75 Corn. L. Rev. 1151, 1154 (1990); Maxeiner,
Bane of American Forfeiture Law—Banished at Last?, 62 Corn. L. Rev. 768,
772 (1977) (hereinafter “Maxeiner”).
[6] Maxeiner, 62 Corn. L. Rev. at
782 n.86.
[7] See, e.g., The Palmyra, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
[8] See United States v. Brig Malek
Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844).
[9] Id. (emphasis added).
[10] Maxeiner, 62 Corn. L. Rev.
at 786-787.
[11] Norris v. Doniphan, 61 Ky.
(4 Met.) 385, 426 (1863).
[12] Miller v. United States, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 305 (1871).
[13] Maxeiner, 62 Corn. L. Rev.
at 787.
[14] Copeland, “Civil Forfeiture
for the Non-Lawyer,” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance
Forfeiture Project, Spring 1992.
[15] An excellent summary of these
reports is contained in a 1999 Policy Briefing on Asset Forfeiture written
by Scott Ehlers, Senior Policy Analyst at the Drug Policy Foundation (hereinafter
“Ehlers”).
[20] Hegeman, “Agencies Split Motel
Sale Proceeds, Former Owners Cry Foul,” Associated Press, March 20, 1999.
[21] U.S. v. James Daniel Good
Real Property, 114 S.Ct. 492, 515 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
[22] Hyde, Forfeiting Our Property
Rights 6-7 (1995) (hereinafter “Hyde”).
[25] 116 S.Ct. 994 (1996).
[27] N.J.S.A. §§ 2C:64-3e-g.
[28] N.J.S.A. § 2C:64-3e.
[29] State v.$7,000, 642 A.2d 967
(N.J. 1994).
[31] State v. One 1988 Honda Prelude,
599 A.2d 932 (N.J. App. Div. 1991).
[32] 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1).
[33] See Fried, Rationalizing Criminal
Forfeiture, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 328, 364 (1988).
[34] 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4).
[35] 28 U.S.C. § 853(i)(4).
[36] See U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Federal Forfeiture of the Instruments and Proceeds of Crime: The Program
in a Nutshell 1 (1990).
[40] 28 U.S.C. § 853(i)(4).
[41] 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1).
[42] Blumenson & Nilsen, Policing
for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev.
35, 40 (1998) (hereinafter “Blumenson & Nilsen”).
[44] Blumenson & Nilsen, 65 U.
Chi. L. Rev. at 63-64 n. 103.
[48] Dillon, “Police Keep Cash
Intended for Education,” Kansas City Star, January 2, 1999.
[49] N.J.S.A. § 2C:64-6a.
[50] N.J.S.A. §§ 2C:35-1 et seq.,
2C:36-1 et seq.
[51] Figures supplied by the State
of New Jersey Department of Law and Public safety in the compliance with
New Jersey’s Appropriations Act.
[52] See N.J.S.A. § 2C:61-1a.
[53] Figures supplied by the State
of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety in compliance with New
Jersey’s Appropriations Act.
[54] Method, “Porsches to Perfume
on the Block at Annual County Auction,” Asbury Park Press, July 10, 1998.
[55] Gaudiano, “Drug Arrest Turns
Into Windfall for Mahwah Police,” The Record, May 18, 2000.
[57] Moore & Consoli, “Seized Funds
Pay for Frills,” The Record, December 31, 1995.
[59] See Buchanan & Tullock, The
Calculus of Consent (1962) (seminal treatment of the implications of the
self-interest axiom for public policy decision-making).
[60] The Federalist No. 51 (James
Madison).
[61] See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510 (1927) (overturning fine where mayor, who also sat as a judge, personally
received a share of the fines); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S.
57 (1972) (due process violated where substantial portion of town’s income
came from fines imposed by town mayor sitting as judge).
[62] 446 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1980)